I'd not consider that argument solid at all, considering that SVIB and Silvergate are the only ones bankrupt, while the other banks are solvent.
Instead, I'd look at the concentration of depositors within narrow geographic and professional areas and their connections to one another, which allows panic to spread faster and enables a bank run; other banks have a much broader and diverse set of depositors. I'd also look at the foolishness of some of those depositors who deposited far too much in one bank instead of distributing funds across many banks. Both are errors of over-concentration. Retail banking only made up 7% of deposits at SVIB; the rest was VC/tech money. That's not by any stretch of the imagination like other banks, and that's what caused this unique failure, not the same interest rate hikes that all banks are exposed to (and which they all account for regularly in internal exercises and stress tests like responsible banks do).
Instead, I'd look at the concentration of depositors within narrow geographic and professional areas and their connections to one another, which allows panic to spread faster and enables a bank run; other banks have a much broader and diverse set of depositors. I'd also look at the foolishness of some of those depositors who deposited far too much in one bank instead of distributing funds across many banks. Both are errors of over-concentration. Retail banking only made up 7% of deposits at SVIB; the rest was VC/tech money. That's not by any stretch of the imagination like other banks, and that's what caused this unique failure, not the same interest rate hikes that all banks are exposed to (and which they all account for regularly in internal exercises and stress tests like responsible banks do).