The complaint is long on evidence of false advertising, but shorter on evidence that the "predatory trading" was actually predatory. There's a certain amount of foamy fulmination at "predatory trading," but nowhere is there any evidence suggesting that Barclays's institutional clients were actually harmed by it.
He then goes on to suggest that the lawsuit is therefore essentially frivolous (in his words, "a self-referential argument.")
His reasoning is flawed, of course. For one thing, commercial fraud is always harmful, even if you can't always prove that someone suffered specific losses for it. For another, the banks agreed explicitly agreed to comply with all pertinent legislation (including the Martin Act) in exchange for the privilege of obtaining a charter which allowed them to become banks in the first place. Whether one thinks the Martin Act is overly broad or gives too much leeway to prosecutors is of secondary importance.
Yes, I had the same problem with the article. The lawsuit just seems to be cherry picking which part of Barclay's paradoxical claims to trust, not creating its own self referential problems.
If Barclay's could get HFTs out of their products then their situation wouldn't be much different from diet cola and they could raise a fair amount of FUD against the competition irregardless of quality of evidence. But you can't sell the same product yet claim you have removed the "harmful" component. Claiming you know it is not really harmful just means you were up to 2 fraudulent activities to deprive the market and your customers of a better arrangement.
The complaint is long on evidence of false advertising, but shorter on evidence that the "predatory trading" was actually predatory. There's a certain amount of foamy fulmination at "predatory trading," but nowhere is there any evidence suggesting that Barclays's institutional clients were actually harmed by it.
He then goes on to suggest that the lawsuit is therefore essentially frivolous (in his words, "a self-referential argument.")
His reasoning is flawed, of course. For one thing, commercial fraud is always harmful, even if you can't always prove that someone suffered specific losses for it. For another, the banks agreed explicitly agreed to comply with all pertinent legislation (including the Martin Act) in exchange for the privilege of obtaining a charter which allowed them to become banks in the first place. Whether one thinks the Martin Act is overly broad or gives too much leeway to prosecutors is of secondary importance.